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The ability to generate novel hypotheses is an important problem-solving capacity of
humans. This ability is vital for making sense of the complex and unfamiliar world we live in.
Often, this capacity is characterized as an inference to the best explanation—selecting the
“best” explanation from a given set of candidate hypotheses. However, it remains unclear
where these candidate hypotheses originate from. In this paper we contribute to computationally explaining these origins by providing the contours of the computational problem
solved when humans generate hypotheses. The origin of hypotheses, otherwise known
as abduction proper, is hallmarked by seven properties: (1) isotropy, (2) open-endedness,
(3) novelty, (4) groundedness, (5) sensibility, (6) psychological realism, and (7) computational
tractability. In this paper we provide a computational-level theory of abduction proper that
uniﬁes the ﬁrst six of these properties and lays the groundwork for the seventh property of
computational tractability. We conjecture that abduction proper is best seen as a process of
deep analogical inference.

1. INTRODUCTION
In order to interact with their (social) environment, human
beings are continuously faced with the problem of making
sense of the world they live in. The capacity to formulate
an explanation for a given observation is called abductive
inference (Peirce, 1974). This type of inference is inherently
uncertain and fallible, which is contrasted by deductive
inference where the inferences are truths derived from the
observation using deduction rules. Abductive inference is
considered to be a central part of human cognition (Chater
& Oaksford, 2000; Fodor, 1983; Haselager, 1997; Peirce,
1974). Often, this capacity is characterized as an inference to
the best explanation (IBE)—selecting the “best” explanation
from a set of candidate hypotheses (Chater, 1999; Chater &
Manning, 2006; Glass, 2007; Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, &
Thagard, 1986; Lipton, 1991; Thagard, 1988, 2000; van der
Helm, 2000). However, accounts of IBE assume that the set
of candidate hypotheses is given, and therefore they do not
explain the origin of the set of candidate hypotheses, also
known as abduction proper (Fodor, 2000; Perfors, 2012).

Recently, there has been an increased interest among cognitive scientists in developing accounts that do explain the
origin of candidate hypotheses (Gentner & Colhoun, 2010;
Goodman, Mansinghka, Roy, Bonawitz, & Tenenbaum,
2008; Goodman, Tenenbaum, & Gerstenberg, 2015; Lake,
Salakhutdinov, & Tenenbaum, 2015; Tenenbaum, Grifﬁths,
& Kemp, 2006). In this paper we will contribute to these
efforts by unifying seven necessary properties of abduction
proper in one theory.
The question “where do candidate hypotheses come
from?” can be illustrated with problems solved during
human communication. For example, imagine two friends in
a loud and crowded pub. From across the crowd one friend
sees the other making a gesture: she puts the ﬁngertips of her
hands together to form a triangular shape. The observer realizes that his friend is going home. The capacity for generating
and understanding communicative signals showcases several key properties of the origin of hypotheses. We highlight
seven necessary properties of sets of candidate hypotheses:
isotropy, open-endedness, novelty, groundedness, sensibility,
psychological realism, and computational tractability.
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Isotropy: Any knowledge that a person has can potentially be
relevant for making the abductive inference (Fodor, 1983). In the
context of the example above, even seemingly unrelated knowledge about role-playing games might be relevant. Knowing that
role-playing games include wizards wearing pointed hats, and
the friend likes role-playing games, then one may hypothesize
that she is inviting us to come play a game with her.
Open-endedness: The set of candidate hypotheses can contain each hypothesis that a person can in principle generate
(Goodman, 1983). That is, it contains all hypotheses that can
be generated (in all possible ways) based on all knowledge a
person possesses, which in principle can be inﬁnitely many
(Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988). For example, your friend’s gesture may mean home or wizard, but it could also mean roof,
house, logical and, diving, ship, wedging, beak, space shuttle,
diving, hat, etc.
Novelty: The set of candidate hypotheses can contain hypotheses that a person has never generated before (Fodor, 1983;
Goodman, 1983). For example, this may be the ﬁrst time
one has encountered a “going home” gesture; hence the
hypothesis about its meaning has to be generated de novo.
This implies that the meaning of a gesture cannot always be
inferred by a simple look-up table or priming mechanism
(Pickering & Garrod, 2004, 2013). If it cannot be inferred as
such, it has to be generated de novo.
Groundedness: A candidate hypothesis must have a welldeﬁned relation to a representation of the observation that
is to be explained (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003). There are two
types of observations that abduction proper can explain:
perceptual observations such as the gesture from the example, and internal “observations” such as the scientiﬁc conclusion that some elementary particle must exist. Assuming
that both types of observation are explained by the same
abduction proper capacity, that capacity minimally needs to
be able to account for hypotheses being grounded into perceptual representations. In the case of perceptual observations, this property can be construed as classic groundedness
(Barsalou, 1999). Whereas groundedness requires the existence of some well-deﬁned relationship between observation
and hypothesis, sensibility (see next) requires that the nature
of that relationship is explanatory.
Sensibility: A common criticism of accounts of IBE is that picking the “best” hypothesis need not return a “good” hypothesis
if the set does not contain any “good” hypotheses (what has
been called “the best of a bad lot” by van Fraasen, 1985; and
also by Kuipers, 2000). This criticism can be addressed by
asserting that the set of candidate hypotheses contains only
sensible candidate hypotheses. A “sensible” hypothesis is not
just grounded in the sense above, but in principle (in some

context) each candidate hypothesis must be able to explain
the observation (Kuipers, 2000; van Fraasen, 1985).
Psychological realism: The computational processes that support abduction proper must be psychologically realistic.
Whether or not a computational characterization of abduction proper has this property is an empirical question.
When it does, the set of candidate hypotheses is naturally
constrained to those hypotheses that can (in principle) be
inferred by humans.
Computational tractability: Although much of human cognition is computationally impressive, ultimately it is bounded
by limited computational power. This implies that any computational account of abductive inference must be computationally tractable (Frixione, 2001; van Rooij, 2008). From a
theoretical perspective, this property seems antagonistic to
isotropy and open-endedness, yet it is necessary if the theory
is to explain how resource-bounded humans can perform
abduction proper.
In this paper we present a computational-level theory
(Bechtel & Shagrir, 2015; Blokpoel, 2017; Marr, 1982) that
aims to unify these seven properties. We propose this uniﬁcation can be achieved by viewing the origin of hypotheses
as a process of deep analogical inference. Whereas a single
analogical inference ﬁnds one structural relation between
two representations, deep analogical inference allows many
consecutive and branching analogical inferences that lead
to sets of candidate hypotheses. In the main paper, we
focus on our theoretical contributions. We present a formal
characterization of abductive inference and the origin of
hypotheses. Throughout the paper, we will highlight how the
computational-level theory incorporates these properties.

For an illustrative case study on how the theory can explain
abduction proper in communication, we refer the reader to
the Appendix where we show how deep analogical inference
can explain the interpretation of a communicative signal in
a director-matcher-type communication game (de Ruiter,
Noordzij, Newman-Norlund, Hagoort, & Toni, 2007).
1.1. ABDUCTIVE INFERENCE
To understand the nature of the origin of hypotheses, it is
necessary to understand how this origin relates to IBE.
Unless one assumes that all candidate hypotheses are predeﬁned, there must be some process that works either before
or in tandem with IBE, providing the candidate hypotheses. This generative process is called abduction proper
(Haselager, 1997; Lipton, 1991). Both abduction proper and
IBE together make up abductive inference. Following notational conventions from computer science (see Ausiello et al.,
1999; and also see van Rooij, Wright, & Wareham, 2012),
we can characterize abductive inference as an input–output
mapping:
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Complete Abductive Inference (informal)
Input: Evidence e and knowledge K.
Output: The hypothesis h, where h = Inference to the
Best Explanation (e, Abduction Proper(e, K)).
Based on observed evidence e and all internal knowledge K,
the cognizer generates a hypothesis h that can explain the
evidence. Complete abductive inference is based on two
sub-functions: Inference to the Best Explanation(.)
and Abduction Proper(.). Note that Inference to the
Best Explanation requires Abduction Proper to provide
a set of candidate explanations. Furthermore, because the
theory is a functional characterization, we can characterize
Inference to the Best Explanation and Abduction
Proper separately, even if algorithmically the two functions
might be intricately intertwined. To continue, Inference to
the Best Explanation can be characterized as follows:
Inference to the Best Explanation (informal)
Input: Evidence e and a set of candidate hypotheses H.
Output: The hypothesis h ∈ H that best explains e.
The nature of IBE has been extensively debated (Glass, 2007;
Hanson, 1958; Hobbs, 2004; Lipton, 1991; Peirce, 1974;
Thagard, 1991) and many characterizations of the notion
of “best” have been proposed, such as “most probable” and
“most likely” (Lipton, 1991), “most coherent” (Glass, 2007;
Thagard, 2000), “simplest” (Chater, 1999; van der Helm,
2000), or mixtures of these (Holland et al., 1986; Thagard,
1988). Regardless of the nature of IBE, its functioning critically depends on the presumed availability of a set of candidate hypotheses H. Without a set of candidate hypotheses
H from which to pick the best, IBE does not do anything.
This is theoretically problematic, because we cannot always
presuppose that a set of candidate hypotheses H is given.
Therefore, a complete account of abductive inference should
also specify the origin of hypotheses, i.e., abduction proper:
Abduction Proper (informal)
Input: Evidence e and knowledge K.
Output: A set of candidate hypotheses H based on e and K.
Characterized in this way, the input–output mapping of
abduction proper is underspeciﬁed because it does not specify the relationship between a set of candidate hypotheses
and the evidence and knowledge. In this paper, we build on
the structure-mapping theory (SMT) of analogy to specify
exactly this relationship.
1.2. THE ANALOGICAL ORIGIN OF HYPOTHESES
Analogical reasoning has been conjectured to lie at the core of
the human capacity for understanding the world around them,
sometimes with a strong emphasis on embodied–embedded
cognition (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, 2003), in particular in

domains that require creative leaps such as language learning and understanding (Gentner & Christie, 2010), concept
learning (Gentner, 2010), (insight) problem solving (Gick
& Holyoak, 1980, 1983), similarity judgment (Gentner &
Markman, 1997; Gentner & Medina, 1998), scientiﬁc explanation (Gentner et al., 1997), perception (Chalmers, French,
& Hofstadter, 1992; Hesse, 1974; Hofstadter & Sander, 2013),
and generalization (Christie & Gentner, 2010). Given that
these domains all involve the generation of hypotheses, it
suggests that analogical reasoning may be at the foundation
of abduction proper.
The goal of this paper is to characterize abduction proper
at Marr’s (1982) computation level and to unify six properties (excluding computational tractability). Hence, the theory
that we present is a characterization of the what of abduction
proper, and not yet the how (Bechtel & Shagrir, 2015). In
the last few decades, many accounts of analogical reasoning
have been proposed across different levels of explanation.
Examples include Tabletop (French & Hofstadter, 1992),
Copycat (Hofstadter, 1996), ACME (Holyoak & Thagard,
1989), LISA (Hummel & Holyoak, 1997), and SMT (Gentner,
1983) and its associated Engine (Falkenhainer, Forbus, &
Gentner, 1989). For extensive overviews, see French (2002)
and Gentner & Forbus (2011). We will build our theory on
SMT, as it is one of the few theories that includes a computational-level characterization. Researchers interested in
developing algorithmic-level models of abduction proper—
models that explain how the inferences are computed—can
use the model that we present as a constraining guide on
possible algorithmic-level theories (cf. Blokpoel, 2017).
The SMT of analogy is a good choice to characterize abduction proper (Gentner, 1983; Gentner & Colhoun, 2010; Gentner
& Smith, 2013), because SMT already has the potential to cover
three of the seven necessary properties, i.e., novelty, sensibility, and psychological realism. First, a candidate hypothesis in
SMT consists of an analogical match between two (relational)
representations and possible (projected) inferences from one to
the other. Because analogical matches and inferences can cross
domains, a candidate hypothesis can result in representations
that are novel. The classical solar system to atom analogy illustrates this nicely, where the explanation for planetary revolution
is transferred by analogy to explain electron revolution in an
atom (see Gentner, 1983). Second, analogy makes a reasonable
operationalization of sensibility. If, in an analogical inference,
one of the two representations is that of an observation, then
the resulting hypothesis can be used to explain that observation
by analogy. In the example from the Introduction, the representation resulting from observing the gesture by a friend may
match with the representation of home. One can thus explain
her gesture, by analogy, as meaning home. Third, SMT has
much empirical evidence supporting it and it has been used to
model cognition in various domains (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005;
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Forbus, Gentner, Everett, & Wu, 1997; Forbus, Gentner, & Law,
1995; Gentner, 1989, 2003a; Gentner & Christie, 2010; Gentner
& Markman, 1997; Kuehne, Forbus, Gentner, & Quinn, 2000;
Lovett, Gentner, & Forbus, 2006; Wolff & Gentner, 2011). This
contributes to the psychological realism of the processes postulated by SMT. Hence, if the set of candidate hypotheses consists
only of hypotheses generated by SMT processes, the set is naturally constrained in the sense that it excludes candidate hypotheses that are outside the scope of the psychologically plausible
processes.
This leaves four properties yet unexplained: isotropy,
open-endedness, groundedness, and computational tractability.
We propose an extension of SMT that uses its key processes of
analogical matching and projection to generate a set of candidate
hypotheses through deep analogical inference. We conjecture
that sets of candidate hypotheses may be built through recursive
analogical matching and projection, which we call deep analogical inference. This extension of SMT will impart three additional
properties to the theory (isotropy, open-endedness, and groundedness), and set the stage for addressing the ﬁnal property: computational tractability. It does so in the following ways. First, all
candidate hypotheses generated by deep analogical inference
are potentially grounded, because deep analogical inference
guarantees a relationship between the observation and the candidate hypothesis, and the representation of the observation can
be perceptual in nature. Second, the set of candidate hypotheses
is also open-ended, as the characterization includes all possible
hypotheses a person can in principle generate. Third, isotropy is
guaranteed because all knowledge representations available to a
person serve as a potential link in the chain of deep analogical
inference. Finally, by formalizing the theory at the computational level, we will lay the groundwork for investigating under
which conditions it is computationally tractable (cf. van Rooij,
2008; van Rooij, Evans, Müller, Gedge, & Wareham, 2008).
In the next section we review alternative accounts of
abduction proper, after which we cover the key processes of
SMT that the theory of deep analogical inference extends.
1.3. CURRENT ACCOUNTS OF ABDUCTION PROPER
Accounts that aim to explain abduction proper other than the
one presented in this paper exist. Although some accounts
may have the potential to unify the seven necessary properties, it is not yet clear if or how they do that. Proponents
of these accounts may ﬁnd it valuable to investigate to what
extent these properties are already incorporated, or ensure
that they are in future iterations of their accounts.
Church: Church (Goodman et al., 2008) is a modeling
framework capable of generating hypotheses by performing probabilistic inference over computational expressions
(λ-calculus). Because λ-calculus is Turing-complete, there are
no restrictions on the hypotheses that Church can generate.

An argument can be made that Church incorporates the
isotropy, open-endedness, and novelty properties. However,
it is not clear how it can incorporate the groundedness, sensibility, psychological realism, and computational tractability
properties as this is left to modelers using the framework.
Hierarchical Bayesian models: Hierarchical Bayesian models
(Lake et al., 2015; Tenenbaum, Kemp, Grifﬁths, & Goodman,
2011) form a modeling framework that can generate hypotheses by virtue of grammar or programming-language structures that are built in. Hierarchical Bayesian models are
meant to bridge symbolic representations with probabilistic computations. In principle, like Church, hierarchical
Bayesian models as a framework have the capacity to unify
all seven necessary properties. However, whether or not they
do that depends crucially on the structures being able to generate the right sets of hypotheses. The approach, so far, seems
not to have focused on identifying which structures lead to
the seven properties.
Structure-mapping theory and engine: As mentioned, SMT
(Gentner, 1983) can explain three properties: novelty, sensibility, and psychological realism. To explain the remaining
properties, the theory needs to be extended. Although there
is room for debate as to what extent algorithmic-level incarnations of SMT incorporate some of the properties, to our
best knowledge none of the four remaining properties have
been addressed at the computational level.

2. STRUCTURE-MAPPING THEORY
The groundwork for the model of abduction proper given in
this paper lies in SMT. According to SMT (Gentner, 1983),
analogical reasoning consists of ﬁnding analogical matches
between a base and target and then projecting inferences from
the base to the target. Analogical matches are determined
by ﬁnding structural overlap between two relational representations. These three concepts are used to characterize the
theory Analogical Abduction Proper: relational representations, analogical matches, and projection. We brieﬂy
introduce them here.
2.1. RELATIONAL REPRESENTATION
Knowledge in SMT is represented relationally, i.e., knowledge is represented in terms of objects, attributes, functions,
and most importantly relations. Objects such as Ball, Red
and Mary may form the basic elements of a representation
such as “A girl named Mary kicked the red ball.” Attributes
and functions such as isGirl(.) and isSphere(.) are relations
that can have only one object as their argument and they
return, respectively, true or false or an ordinal value. Finally,
relations such as hasColor(.,.) and kicked(.,.) can take two
or more arguments which can be other relations, attributes,
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functions, or objects. Using these building blocks, one can
deﬁne relational representations. For example:
(1) Kicked (isGirl (Mary), hasColor (isSphere (Ball), Red))
2.2. ANALOGICAL MATCHING
An analogical match is deﬁned as the structural overlap
between two relational representations. The overlap consists
of correspondences between entities in both representations.
Some entities, like objects, attributes, and functions, can correspond to any entity of the same type. Relational entities,
however, can only correspond to entities of the same type
and with the same label. Furthermore, matches in SMT have
to be structurally consistent (Gentner, 1983) in the sense that
matches have to satisfy the following two constraints:
1. 1:1 correspondence: Each entity that is part of the match
can only be part of one correspondence.
2. Parallel connectivity: If an entity is part of the match, then
all its arguments should also be part of the match.
Analogical matching can, for example, explain how another
child, James, can believe that kicking a can is good pretend
play for playing soccer (i.e., kicking a round ball). The following relational representation matches to Representation (1),
because kicked(.,.) corresponds and so do all its arguments.
(2) kicked (isBoy (James), hasColor (isCylindrical (Can),
Silver))
Note that this match (and analogical matches in general) only
works because structural overlap is guaranteed and because
labels of objects, attributes, and functions can be ignored.
This is how SMT can explain why analogical inferences can
transcend domains, yet remain sound.
A high-quality analogical match is one that has high systematicity. Systematicity is assumed to be higher the more
the analogical match is interconnected and the more deeply
nested substructures it contains (Clement & Gentner, 1991;
Forbus & Gentner, 1989; Gentner, 1983, 1989). There is
much empirical evidence that SMT accurately captures how
humans make analogical inferences (see Gentner, 2010;
Gentner & Colhoun, 2010; Gentner & Smith, 2013).
2.3. INFERENCE PROJECTION AND VARIABLE INSTANTIATION
Based on an analogical match, it is possible to transfer information from one representation (the base) to the other (the
target). The main constraint on projections is that the projected part of the base has to connect to at least one attribute,
function, or relation in the overlapping structure. Additional
projection constraints exist, e.g., based on goal relevance
(Spellman & Holyoak, 1996), adaptability (Keane, 1996), and
support and/or extrapolation (Forbus et al., 1997; Gentner,

2003b; Wareham, Evans, & van Rooij, 2011). An important
feature of projections is that they can transfer knowledge
from one domain to another, because analogical matches
can cross domains. Consider the following extension to
Representation 1:
(1a) is (kicked (isGirl (Mary), hasColor (isSphere (Ball),
Red)), PlayingSoccer)
Representation 1a also matches Representation 2, because
kicked(.,.) corresponds. Based on that match is(.,PlayingSoccer) can be projected onto Representation 2 (indicated in
bold), further modeling how James can pretend-play soccer
with a tin can.
(2a) is(kicked (isBoy (James), hasColor (isCylindrical
(Can), Silver)), PlayingSoccer)
In addition to projection there is a second way to transfer
knowledge from the base to the target representation called
variable instantiation (Gentner & Medina, 1998). With variable instantiation, objects in the target representation can be
replaced by objects from the base representation if they analogically match. A target object that is replaced in this way
can be seen, in a sense, as a variable that is instantiated by the
value from the base object.
2.4. CANDIDATE HYPOTHESIS
An analogical match, a projection, and a variable instantiation can be combined to form a candidate hypothesis. Such
a hypothesis is a quintuple 〈b,t,m,ρ,ι〉, where b is the base
representation, t the target representation, m the analogical
match between them, ρ a projection function that transfers
structure from b to t, and ι an instantiation function that
replaces objects in t with objects from b. This structure is a
candidate hypothesis, because there is no guarantee that the
information transformed onto the target is correct. This is
not a problem for the purpose of characterizing abduction
proper, because abduction proper precisely is about generating hypotheses, whereas IBE is about selecting the best
hypothesis.
The processes and concepts from SMT are the basic
operators used in the computational-level characterization of Analogical Abduction Proper. Analogical
Abduction Proper goes beyond SMT, because it characterizes a set of candidate hypotheses compared to a single
candidate hypothesis.

3. ABDUCTION PROPER BY DEEP ANALOGICAL INFERENCE
Using the formal notions of representation, matching, inference projection, and variable instantiation from SMT, we can
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formally characterize Analogical Abduction Proper. The
foundation of Analogical Abduction Proper lies in the
recursive application of analogical matching and inference projection. We call this Deep Analogical Inference because it
consists of (potentially) many consecutive analogical inferences. Analogical Abduction Proper uniﬁes six out of the
seven necessary properties. Three are derived properties from
SMT: novelty, sensibility, and psychological realism. Three
more properties come by virtue of the extension: isotropy,
open-endedness, and groundedness. Finally, in the discussion
section we reﬂect on how the extension lays the groundwork
for satisfying computational tractability. We highlight the relevant parts of the theory for each property. We explain the theory in a top-down manner so that it is clear what role each
sub-function plays in the function in which it is contained.
We start by deﬁning a candidate hypothesis as a quintuple 〈b,t,m,ρ,ι〉. Here, m is an analogical match between two
relational representations b and t, ρ is the related inference
projection, and ι is the variable instantiation. We start by providing a formal characterization of Analogical Abduction
Proper and then continue by formalizing each sub-function.
Analogical Abduction Proper
Input: A relational representation of evidence e and a
set of relational representations of knowledge K.
Output: A complete set of candidate hypotheses H,
where H = ∪ Analogical
k∈K

Candidate Hypotheses(e, K, k).
Compared to the informal deﬁnition from the Introduction
we add the assumption that e is a relational representation
of evidence and that K is a set of relational representations
of all knowledge. All candidate hypotheses in the output are
based on the evidence e, which guarantees that all candidate
hypotheses are grounded. The output is based on Analogical
Candidate Hypotheses, which returns all possible candidate
hypotheses for e relative to a core k. The complete set of candidate hypotheses is the uniﬁed set of all possible candidate
hypotheses for all cores k ∈ K. This is the ﬁrst part of the theory
that contributes to its isotropy, i.e., by considering all cores.
Analogical Candidate Hypotheses
Input: A relational representation of evidence e, a set of
relational representations of knowledge K, and a relational representation of a core k.
Output: A set of candidate hypotheses (relative to k) Hk,
where
Hk = ∪

∪ 〈 e′, k′, m,

,ι 〉

M
P
I

Analogical Candidate Hypotheses outputs a set of candidate hypotheses for e relative to a core k. These candidate

hypotheses 〈e′, k ′, m, ρ , ι 〉 are based on every analogical
match m, projection ρ, and instantiation ι that can be found
between all possible representations of the evidence e and
all possible representations of the core k. We characterize
all possible representations of a base representation with
Deep Analogical Inference (D), which outputs all representations that can be built from the base representation
by recursively making analogical inferences using all pieces
of knowledge in K. This is the second part of the theory that
contributes to its isotropy, i.e., by considering all candidate
hypotheses between all possible representations of evidence
and knowledge. Note that each hypothesis contains a welldeﬁned relation between the core and the evidence e (see
also Figures 1 and 2). Hence, the theory is grounded even in
the classical sense since the evidence can (but need not) be
perceptual (Forbus, Gentner, Markman, & Ferguson, 1998).
Furthermore, Analogical Candidate Hypotheses outputs an open-ended set of candidate hypotheses in the sense
that the set contains all hypotheses that can be generated
based on all knowledge a person possesses.
As explained in the previous section, SMT allows for any
part of the base that connects to the match to be transferred
and instantiated onto the target. Exactly how much is projected
and instantiated is still debated in the literature (Gentner &
Colhoun, 2010; Gentner & Smith, 2013), but various proposals
for characterizations have been made based on goal relevance
(Spellman & Holyoak, 1996), adaptability (Keane, 1996), and
support and/or extrapolation (Forbus et al., 1997; Gentner,
2003b; Wareham et al., 2011). At the time of writing there are
two options for the theory. The ﬁrst option is to choose one
of the (debated) proposals and (possibly incorrectly) assume
that it produces the relevant projections and instantiations.
However, which projections and instantiations are relevant
may vary wildly, hence the debate. The second option deﬁnes
Match(e′, k ′), Proj(e′, k ′, m) and Inst(e′, k ′, m) such that they
actually return all possible matches, projections, and instantiations between e′ and k ′ that conform to SMT in general. In this
way, the theory does not exclude potentially relevant candidate
hypotheses. Here we choose the second option.
The ﬁnal two pieces of the puzzle are Deep Analogical
Inference and Analogical Augmentation.
Deep Analogical Inference (D)
Input: A relational representation a and a set of
relational representations K.
Output: The set of all possible representations of a
relative to K:
  AA(a, k ) ∪ D(AA(a, k ), K ),
k∈K
(1)
D(a, K ) =  ∅ ,
∃ AA(a, k ) ≠ ∅
 if
k∈K

otherwise
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Analogical Augmentation (AA)
Input: Two relational representations a and k.
Output: Given the analogical match m = Match(k, a)
with the highest systematicity, return a′ = ρ (a), where
ρ ∈ Proj(k,a,m) is the biggest possible projection. If no
match is possible, return ∅.
The second, given representations a and k, returns an augmentation of a by ﬁnding the most systematic match with k
and projecting the biggest structure possible from k to a. Deep
Analogical Inference recursively applies Analogical
Augmentation (AA) as often as possible. Thereby, it returns
the set of all possible representations of a. The third and ﬁnal
part of the theory that contributes to its isotropy is that deep
analogical inference returns sets of representations that are
based on all possible sequences of analogical inferences (i.e.,
match and projection) with all knowledge. This also contributes to the theory being open-ended. Figure 1 provides an
illustration of Deep Analogical Inference.
The four formal characterizations (Analogical Abduction Proper, Analogical Candidate Hypotheses, Deep
Analogical Inference, and Analogical Augmentation) presented in this section together form a complete

theory of Abduction Proper that uniﬁes six of the seven
necessary properties. Figure 2 provides an illustration of
Analogical Candidate Explanations. It shows how
analogical matches and projections between representations
from two spaces of reconceptualized representations (one
space for the evidence e and one for the core k) make up a
set of candidate hypotheses relative to the core k. Analogical Abduction Proper combines each subset of candidate
hypotheses for all k ∈ K.

4. DISCUSSION
In this paper we have proposed that the origin of hypotheses
(otherwise known as abduction proper) may lie in deep analogical inference. We identiﬁed seven necessary properties
that any account of abduction proper should have: isotropy
(Fodor, 1983), open-endedness (Goodman, 1983), novelty
(Fodor, 1983; Goodman, 1983), groundedness (Barsalou,
1999; Lakoff & Johnson, 2003), sensibility (Kuipers, 2000;
van Fraassen, 1985), psychological realism, and computational tractability (Frixione, 2001; van Rooij, 2008). We
characterized abduction proper based on processes from
the SMT of analogy. This characterization, called analogical

d3
d2
d1
c
b

Relational Representation
Analogical Augmentation

a

Figure 1.
Deep Analogical Inference D. By recursively applying Analogical Augmentation to the relational representation a, this function characterizes all possible representations of a. The gray sequence
highlights one such representation path: a analogically matches to some knowledge k and can be
augmented via analogical projection into b. Then b is similarly transformed into c and c into d1, d2, and
d3. Finally, the d’s do not match to any knowledge k ∈ K which ends the recursion. Here, we can o bserve
that if a is a perceptual representation, then each representation built on top of a is grounded in
(i.e., has a well-deﬁned relationship with) a by virtue of the transitive analogical relation.
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all possible representations of evidence e

all possible representations of core k

analogical match

Figure 2.
Analogical Abduction Proper. Analogical matches and projections between representations from two
spaces of all possible representations make up a set of candidate hypotheses relative to the core k. On the
left is the space of all possible representations for the evidence e and on the right is the space for the core
k. The complete ﬁgure would include multiple of these analogy “networks,” namely one for each core k ∈ K.
This ﬁgure also illustrates how candidate hypotheses can be grounded in perception.

abduction proper, has six out of seven properties and lays
the groundwork for pursuing the computational tractability
of abduction proper. This opens up two new research lines:
the development of and integration with theoretical accounts
of knowledge acquisition and solving the paradox of tractable abductive inference. Before we cover these research lines,
we ﬁrst explain how analogical abduction proper covers six
necessary properties of abduction proper.
4.1. NECESSARY PROPERTIES OF ABDUCTION PROPER
The computational-level theory of analogical abduction
proper uniﬁes six out of seven necessary properties of abduction proper under one theory. We brieﬂy summarize these
properties and explain how analogical abduction proper
satisﬁes them.
Isotropy: Abduction proper is isotropic in the sense that
any knowledge that a person has is potentially relevant for
some candidate hypothesis. Analogical abduction proper is
isotropic because the set of candidate hypotheses it characterizes contains all hypotheses that can be generated
through deep analogical inference using every possible

knowledge representation available. This means that if a
piece of knowledge is possibly relevant, it will be part of at
least one deep analogical inference path leading to a candidate hypothesis.
Open-endedness: A set of candidate hypotheses is open-ended
if it contains all hypotheses a person can in principle infer.
Analogical abduction proper generates the set of all possible
candidate hypotheses based on all possible deep analogical
reconceptualizations and is therefore open-ended.
Novelty: A set of candidate hypotheses is novel if it can
contain hypotheses that an individual has never generated
before. Because analogical abduction proper is based on analogical inference, it can transfer knowledge from one domain
to another, thereby reconceptualizing representations which
can lead to candidate hypotheses that the individual has
never generated before.
Grounded: For hypotheses to be grounded, any hypothesis
needs to contain some well-deﬁned relationship between the
representation of the observation and its explanation. Each
candidate hypothesis in analogical abduction proper consists
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of an analogical match and inference between (deeply) reconceptualized knowledge and (deeply) reconceptualized observation. Therefore, analogical abduction proper is grounded,
even in the classical sense given that the observation might
be perceptual in nature.
Sensible: A sensible candidate hypothesis is one that can
be used to explain an observation. In analogical abduction
proper, all candidate hypotheses are sensible, as they can
relate the observation via (deep) analogical inference to a
concept. Because analogical inference is only possible when
structural overlap between representations exists, the model
avoids candidate hypotheses where anything goes.
Psychological realism: Analogical abduction proper is constrained by the processes that underlie SMT. This means that
the set of candidate hypotheses is constrained to those candidate hypotheses that can be generated through analogical
matching and projection. The model is empirically supported
to the extent that its component processes from SMT have
considerable empirical support (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005;
Forbus et al., 1995, 1997; Gentner, 1989, 2003a; Gentner &
Christie, 2010; Gentner & Markman, 1997; Kuehne et al.,
2000; Lovett et al., 2006; Wolff & Gentner, 2011). In addition,
we illustrated with an empirical case study how one might
explain observations of abduction proper as it occurs in a
communicative game (see the Appendix).
Computational tractability: Despite analogical abduction
proper being constrained by psychological realism and
sensibility, the sets of candidate hypotheses it generates
are extremely large, potentially even inﬁnite, due to isotropy and open-endedness. Although at ﬁrst sight one may
reject the theory for this computational intractability, we
believe rejection to be too strong a response. The fact that
many theories of abductive inference (including analogical abduction proper) are computationally intractable
(Bylander, Allemang, Tanner, & Josephson, 1991; Nordh &
Zanuttini, 2005) can be seen as a sign that cognitive science
is currently unable to solve Fodor’s frame problem: How
can abductive inference be isotropic, yet computationally
explained (Fodor, 2000)? Where Fodor was pessimistic
about the chances of computational cognitive science fully
solving this problem, we are not and propose a way forward
in the section below.
4.2. COMPUTATIONAL TRACTABILITY OF ABDUCTIVE INFERENCE
It is well known that IBE can be computationally intractable (e.g., NP-hard or worse) even for hypothesis spaces that
are closed and predeﬁned (Abdelbar & Hedetniemi, 1998;
Kwisthout, 2011; Thagard, 2000; Thagard & Verbeurgt,
1998). Inference to the best explanation over open-ended
hypothesis spaces, such as those generated by analogical

abduction proper, can potentially make IBE more difﬁcult to compute. However, it is not an option to exclude
abduction proper from our theories as it is inherently part
of abductive inference. This leads to a paradox. People can
make abductive inferences quickly, but our best theories of
complete abductive inference cannot explain how people
can be so quick.
We think that the approach is far from defeated and that
the apparent intractability is no reason to reject analogical
abduction proper, including its uniﬁcation of six necessary
properties. The reason for our optimism is based on the fact
that computational intractability is not a property of the size
of the search space (even if it is inﬁnite), but of the ability to
search that space efﬁciently. In fact, it is known that certain
functions can become tractable when their search space is
appropriately constrained by adding structure to it that can
be exploited for efﬁcient search (Downey & Fellows, 1999).
This is the basis of a methodology called parameterized
complexity analysis. It can be used to analyze under which
constraints a computational-level characterization can be
tractable (Blokpoel, Kwisthout, van der Weide, Wareham, &
van Rooij, 2013; van Rooij, 2008; van Rooij et al., 2008). It
has already been successfully applied to analyze models of
analogy (van Rooij et al., 2008; Wareham et al., 2011) and
communication (Blokpoel et al., 2012; van Rooij et al., 2011).
This type of analysis can only be applied to well-deﬁned
formal computational-level models, such as the one we presented in this paper. Hence, although our theory is not (yet)
computationally tractable, it opens up the possibility for
future exploration of ways in which its search-space can be
constrained to render it tractable. Such an exploration might,
for example, lead to understanding how structure in the set
of candidate hypotheses (by virtue of sensibility) may constrain IBE and render it tractable.
4.3. KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION
Our model crucially depends on the availability of the set
of all knowledge K to guarantee isotropy. One might argue
that we have shifted the burden of explaining where candidate hypotheses come from to explaining where knowledge
comes from. Knowledge acquisition is, however, a different
explanatory target. Even if a fully satisfactory and agreed
upon account of knowledge acquisition existed, that account
would only explain where knowledge comes from, not how
knowledge is used to form candidate hypotheses that explain
the observations.
The set of knowledge does constrain which candidate
hypotheses can be generated. This means that knowledge
acquisition may play a constraining role in the theory of
analogical abduction proper. Hence, it is important in future
research on abduction proper to understand the nature of
knowledge acquisition.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
The human capacity for generating hypotheses is a phenomenon that is difﬁcult to characterize, mainly because any
such characterization will have to be isotropic, open-ended,
novel, grounded, sensible, psychologically realistic, and
computationally tractable. We have provided a computational-level characterization based on deep analogical inference
that uniﬁes six of the seven necessary properties and lays the
groundwork for pursuing the seventh, i.e., computational
tractability. We believe that this contribution is fundamental
to taking the next step towards fully explaining abduction
proper, as it establishes ﬁrm ground to address future challenges: integrating IBE and abduction proper, developing
algorithmic-level explanations of abductive inference, integrating theories of knowledge acquisition, and solving the
paradox of tractable abductive inference.
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APPENDIX: A CASE STUDY OF DEEP ANALOGICAL INFERENCE
These supplementary materials illustrate a case study for
the computational theory presented in the main paper. We
ﬁrst explain the target phenomenon: the interpretation of an
innovative communicative signal in a communication game.
We then show how a candidate hypothesis can be generated
by using deep analogical inference. We assume that readers
are familiar with the theory as presented in Sections 2 and 3
in the main paper.
A.1. A WINDOW INTO ABDUCTION PROPER: THE TACIT COMMUNICATION GAME
The ability to generate novel hypotheses is difﬁcult to
isolate and study empirically; however, the phenomenon of communicative innovations provides a window
into abduction proper. Communicative innovations
are novel signals that have novel meanings (Stolk et al.,
2013b); hence they require communicators and listeners to generate (novel) hypotheses about their meaning.
They may occur when interlocutors do not have conventionalized signals available. Unfortunately, communicative innovations are often interspersed with conventional
signals in daily communication, making it difﬁcult to
cleanly observe hypothesis generation. Interest in studying the capacity to generate and understand novel signals has led to the emergence of a research ﬁeld called
experimental semiotics. Experimental semioticians have
developed many experimental paradigms to isolate and
study phenomena related to the emergence of communicative innovations (de Ruiter et al., 2010; Galantucci,
2009; Galantucci & Garrod, 2011; Garrod & Doherty,
1994; Kirby, Cornish, & Smith, 2008). These phenomena range from pair interactions (de Ruiter et al., 2010;
Galantucci, 2009) to communities and the evolution of
communication systems (Kirby et al., 2008) and from
developmental capacities (Stolk, Hunnius, Bekkering,
& Toni, 2013a) to neural mechanisms (Noordzij et al.,
2010; Stolk et al., 2013b). We focus on observations from
the Tacit Communication Game (TCG) for two reasons.
First, the TCG was developed to study the emergence of
novel signals and recipient design in pair interactions. It
therefore provides a clear view on abduction proper as it
underlies communication by communicative innovations
without adding inﬂuences of (cultural) evolution and
development. Second, it is one of the most well-studied
semiotic paradigms, offering a solid empirical platform
for isolating instances of abduction proper in human
communication (Blokpoel et al., 2012; de Ruiter et al.,
2010; Noordzij et al., 2010; Stolk et al., 2013a, 2013b,
2014; Stolk, Verhagen, & Toni, 2016; Volman, Noordzij,
& Toni, 2012).

The TCG is a collaborative task between two participants.
To solve the task both participants need certain information,
but information is unevenly distributed. This means that one
of the participants (the sender) has to confer information to
the other participant (the receiver) such that he can solve his
part of the joint task. To prevent participants having direct
access to conventionalized signals, the TCG has communicators design signals in an unconventional medium. This
means that senders are required to generate communicative innovations and receivers are required to understand
those innovations. Both communicating and understanding require the ability to generate genuinely novel candidate
hypotheses. In this section we give details of both the TCG
paradigm and the observations that will form the basis of the
case study.
Paradigm: In the TCG, two players cooperate to solve
a joint task: placing two tokens, each controlled by one
player, correctly on a game board. The 3 × 3 game board
has nine locations and each player’s token (identiﬁed by a
color) can vary in shape (see Figure A1). Furthermore, one
of the players—and only one—receives privileged information about the correct placement of the two tokens in
each trial. This player is the sender and she has to share this
privileged information with the other player, the receiver,
in order to successfully play the game. Movement is done
in turns: first the sender moves her token, then the receiver
may move his token, after which a trial ends. Player tokens
start at the center of the board and players can move only
orthogonally and rotate clockwise 90 degrees1. This means
that one movement sequence of the sender contains both
communicative (i.e., the signal) and instrumental movements (i.e., moving to her goal placement). The TCG is an
experimental semiotic paradigm precisely because senders
have to generate a signal in an unconventional medium,
i.e., by moving and rotating their token on a game board.
As explained earlier, this requires senders to generate communicative innovations, because they cannot simply use
conventionalized signals that they have learned for other
mediums. Consequently, it requires the receiver to be able
to understand communicative innovations. Given that generating and understanding of communicative innovations
require the ability to generate novel candidate hypotheses,
the novel signals and meanings observed in TCG experiments are good subjects for our case study of analogical
abduction proper. We detail some of these signals and their
meanings later in this section.
A trial of the TCG breaks down into the following
sequence (see also Figure A2):
1. Preparation: Both players are shown their respective
tokens for this trial.
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2. Informing/planning: The sender is presented with the target positions of both herself and the receiver and she is
given time to plan her actions.
3. Communicating: The sender’s token is placed in the
center location of the board and she is given time to
execute her planned movement using orthogonal

movement and rotation (note that the circle cannot
rotate). During this step the receiver observes the sender’s token movement.
4. Task completion: The receiver’s token is placed in the center location of the board and he is given time to move and
rotate his token to what he believes is the correct location

Sender’s view
Sender’s tokens

Token placement
information
(privileged)

Receiver’s tokens
Receiver’s view

(a)

(b)

Figure A1.
The Tacit Communication Game. (a) The game is played with the following components:
three different shaped tokens for each player (circle, rectangle, and equilateral triangle)
and a 3 × 3 game board. The starting position for both players is in the center. (b) The
sender has access to privileged information (unavailable to the receiver) about the correct
placement of both tokens.

1. Preparation

4. Task completion

2. Informing/planning

5. Feedback

✓

3. Communicating

Figure A2.
Turn order. Each turn consists of five steps. Tokens can be moved freely in orthogonal directions, and onto other
tokens should they be on the board. They can, if the shape shows it, also be rotated by increments of 90°.
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and orientation based on the communicator’s observed
movement.
5. Feedback: Both players receive conﬁrmation on whether
or not they solved the joint task. The task is solved when
both players’ tokens are in their correct location and orientation as shown in Step 2. If both tokens are correctly
placed, both players are notiﬁed by a green check mark.
If at least one token is misplaced, then the trial is lost and
both players are notiﬁed by a red cross. Note that the players do not receive feedback on what would have been the
correct location and orientation.
We next review key observations of the TCG, including
speciﬁc communicative innovations, which offer a window
into abductive inference including abduction proper.
Key observations: We have already explained that due to the
unconventional nature of the communication medium in
the TCG, senders have to use communicative innovations.
Players have been observed to generate a wide variety of
communicative innovations (see Table A1 for an overview of
TCG signals). This variety is reﬂected most obviously in the

signal itself, but more importantly in the signal’s meaning, of
which any one signal can have many. To appreciate this second observation we have to deﬁne the concept of “meaning”
in the context of the TCG.
Even though there are only 3 × 3 × 4 (board width ×
board height × maximum number of different orientations)
possible conﬁgurations for a token, there are many different
ways to represent a token in a position (e.g., “token at (3,2),”
“circle on a board,” “blue 1 cm by 2 cm object on white 3 cm
by 3 cm square with 1 mm black border,” etc.). This means
that, if the meaning of a signal is a hypothesis about the
sender’s intended meaning, then all of the different representations of the signal and concept lead to uniquely different meanings. This is reﬂected in the TCG, where signals
that look identical can have different behavioral replies on
the receiver’s side (Stolk et al., 2013b). It also, counterintuitively, suggests that the same behavioral response on the
receiver’s part can be the result of different meanings. If the
latter should be the case, then the observed diversity is actually an underestimate of the true diversity of communicative
innovations.

Table A1.
The wide variety of signals and their meanings in the Tacit Communication Game. This list is compiled from observations made by
de Ruiter et al. (2010) and Blokpoel et al. (2012). Here S-token and R-token stand for sender’s and receiver’s token shape, respectively.
These columns indicate with which token shapes (circle, rectangle, or triangle) the signal has been observed.

Signal

Variant

S-token

R-token

Description

Wiggle

Apex

C

R, T

Repetitive motion along an axis from A to B means
the apex should point to B.

Opposite

C

R, T

Repetitive motion along an axis from A to B, where
one repetition means the apex should point to B and
two repetitions mean the opposite orientation.

Rotate

C

R, T

The number of repetitive motions is the number of
times the receiver should rotate his token.

From target location

C, R, T

R, T

The direction in which the sender leaves the target
location is the receiver’s orientation.

From start location

C, R, T

R, T

The direction in which the sender leaves the start
location is the receiver’s orientation.

Exact match

C, R, T

C, R, T

Using the same shaped token, a pause in the
receiver’s target location and orientation signals the
receiver’s target.

Non-match

C, R, T

C, R, T

Using a different shaped token, a pause in the
receiver’s target location and (as closely matched)
orientation signals the receiver’s target.

Motion to point

C

T

A fast motion from one side of the board to the
receiver’s target location signals orientation.

Rotate to rotate

C

R, T

The number of times the sender rotates signals the
number of times the receiver should rotate his token.

Exit to point

Mirror
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In many studies, TCG players begin the game with easy
trials, i.e., trials where both players have identically shaped
tokens. This allows communicators to successfully use “mirror” signals. They can move their own token to the receiver’s
correct location and orientation, then pause, and then continue to their own position. While one can argue whether or
not this signal and its meaning is a communicative innovation, the more interesting communicative behaviors emerge
when the shape of the sender’s token has less rotational
options than that of the receiver’s token shape. For example,
a circle cannot show rotations. A circle thus has fewer rotational options than a triangle, which can be oriented in four
different conﬁgurations. The trials where senders play with
circle tokens and receivers play with triangle tokens result
clearly in communicative innovations.
One such communicative innovation is called the “wiggle”
and this communicative behavior has been observed in many
different studies (de Ruiter et al., 2010; Newman-Norlund
et al., 2009; Stolk et al., 2013b). The wiggle is a communicative innovation generated by senders to indicate location and
orientation of a receiver’s token, when the sender’s token has
less rotational freedom than that of the receiver. For example,
in trials where the sender has to use a circle (which cannot
show rotations) to communicate the orientation of a triangle
(which has four orientations), often—but not always—senders adopt a wiggle signal. Figure A1b displays an example of
the information given to a sender on such a trial. The wiggle signal consists of the communicator pausing her token at
the receiver’s target location to convey that his token should
be positioned there. Then, unable to orient her own circular
token, the sender uses repetitive movements along an axis to
signal the orientation of the receiver’s triangle (see Figure A3).
This signal, however, can mean various things within the context of the game. For instance, it can mean the pointing direction of a triangle (“wiggle apex”), or the number of times a
receiver needs to perform a “rotate” action (“wiggle rotate”),
or even the opposite of the pointing direction depending on
the number of repetitions (“wiggle opposite”; see Table A1).

In order for these communicative innovations to be generated or understood candidate meanings have to be generated
de novo. The possible meanings of these innovations are not
predeﬁned, and they are also open-ended. These properties
are best observed with the wiggle. Therefore, we will use the
wiggle as a case study for Analogical Abduction Proper
in the next section.
A.2. AN EMPIRICAL TEST CASE: GENERATING THE MEANING OF A
“WIGGLE”
As seen in the previous section, the wiggle signal can be interpreted in different ways. We ﬁrst sketch informally how the
“wiggle apex,” “wiggle opposite,” and “wiggle rotate” meanings
can be hypothesized by analogical abduction proper. Then we
present a more detailed and formal analysis of the wiggle apex
meaning. It is important to note that we will limit our case
study to a single augmentation path (the gray annotation in
Figure 1 in the main text) and single candidate hypothesis
(the gray dashed line in Figure 2 in the main text). The key
point here is not to show an entire hypothesis space (as this
would require too many pages), but to show that Analogical
Abduction Proper can in principle generate novel candidate hypotheses. It will become clear that, given a large knowledge base, it can generate a set of candidate hypotheses.
Informal wiggle analysis: Tables A2, A3 and A4 illustrate possible augmentations that can be performed on representations
of the signal and cores such that a candidate meaning can be
hypothesized by ﬁnding a match (and projecting structure)
between the augmented representations. Generating one
possible meaning hypothesis starts with two representations,
one of the signal and one of a possible core. Each consecutive row is an augmentation of the previous representation
with some knowledge via Analogical Augmentation
(depicted by ⇝). On the ﬁnal row (match level) an analogical
match between the reconceptualized evidence and reconceptualized core is found. This ﬁnal match, including a potential
projection and instantion, is a candidate hypothesis about
the meaning of the signal.

Step 1
long p

auze

Step 2
quick st

ep

(a)

Step 3

(b)

Figure A3.
Zooming in on the wiggle signal. The two locations in the time steps in (b) are parts of the
(a) bigger 3 × 3 board.
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Table A2.
Wiggle apex: augmentation and analogical match sketch.

Lowest level

Representations of evidence e
(1) timed sequence of circle locations

    augment with lines
(2) path
augment with alignment
(3) path aligned to frame of reference
augment with start location
(4) path aligned with start
augment with direction
(5) vector with starting location
augment with orientation
Match level

(6) vector with start and orientation

From these sketches we can already make some interesting
observations. The ﬁrst observation is that the a ugmentations
that are required to reconceptualize representations to ﬁnd
a candidate hypothesis are not trivial. The second observation is that the same core representation can lead to different candidate hypotheses, e.g., the “wiggle apex” and “wiggle
opposite” candidate meanings start with the same core representation. The third observation is that multiple different
core representations can form the basis of different candidate meanings, e.g., the “wiggle apex” and “wiggle rotate”
are based on two different core representations. Finally, each
candidate hypothesis is grounded in perception, because it
is an analogy between a reconceptualized representation of
observed evidence and knowledge.
Formal wiggle apex analysis: We now present a formal analysis of the “wiggle apex” strategy to illustrate Analogical
Abduction Proper. For each candidate hypothesis,
Analogical Abduction Proper consists of two parts:
perform deep analogical inference on the evidence and core
representations, then ﬁnd possible analogical inferences
between the resulting representations. In this case study we
ﬁrst show a representation that results from deep analogical inference of the observed evidence, i.e., the actual movements of the sender token on the board. Second, we assume
that a similar process has been done for the core concept “triangle” and illustrate an analogical inference between the two.

⇔

Representations of core k
(1) equilateral triangle
augment with symmetry ⇝
(2) equilateral triangle with axis of symmetry
augment with apex⇝
(3) triangle with axis and apex
augment with alignment ⇝
(4) triangle with apex, aligned to frame of
reference by axis
augment with base ⇝
(5) triangle aligned to frame of reference by axis,
with apex and base
augment with location ⇝
(6) triangle aligned to frame of reference by axis,
with apex and location
augment with direction ⇝
(7) pointing triangle with location augment with
orientation ⇝
(8) triangle with location and orientation

Note that we use speciﬁc representations in the formal
analysis. This, however, does not mean that we commit to
these representations being “true.” In fact, we would argue
that many different representations are psychologically plausible. This is accommodated for in Analogical Abduction
proper, because it is agnostic about the content of the representations. Furthermore, the main point here is to show
that knowledge that is inherently not about the TCG can be
part of the deep analogical inference to generate a candidate
hypothesis that can explain the observed wiggle apex signal.
Representations of evidence and core: We start by introducing the representation of the signal. This representation
(see Figure A4) involves a number of objects, attributes,
functions, and relations. We list these and their interpretation below. Because these representations are quite large,
we will use a graphical notation for readability. A relation
is depicted by its label and two or more arrows pointing to
its arguments. An attribute or function only has one argument, and objects are leaves.
Objects
1. Board: represents the TCG board.
2. (3,3) and (3,2): represent two locations on the TCG
board.
3. FoR: “Frame of Reference” represents an abstract spatial/
geometrical frame.
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Table A3.
Wiggle opposite: augmentation and analogical match sketch.

Lowest level

Representations of evidence e
(1) timed sequence of circle locations augment
with lines ⇝
(2) path
augment with alignment
(3) path aligned to frame of reference
augment with start location
(4) path aligned with start
augment with direction ⇝
(5) vector with starting location

augment with symmetry ⇝
(2) equilateral triangle with axis of symmetry
augment with apex ⇝

(3) triangle with axis and apex
augment with alignment ⇝
(4) triangle with apex, aligned to frame of
reference by axis
augment with base ⇝
(5) triangle aligned to frame of reference by axis,
with apex and base
augment with location ⇝
(6) triangle aligned to frame of reference by axis,
with apex and location
augment with direction ⇝
(7) pointing triangle with location

augment with orientation
(6) vector with start and orientation

Match level

Representations of core k
(1) equilateral triangle

augment with symmetry
(7) vector with start and orientation
and a symmetrical path
augment with counting
(8) vector with start and orientation
and a number
augment with odd/even reverse ⇝

augment with orientation ⇝
(9) vector with start and orientation possibly ⇔ (8) triangle with location and orientation
reversed

is-on

is-at
exists

S1

A

Board
is-at

shorter
delay

A1

exists

Circle

S2

transition-by-action

is-on

line
is-on

B

is-at

delay

exists

A2

S3

is-on

FoR

N

north-of

S

transition-by-action

Figure A4.
Relational representation of the evidence. Graphical representation of the representation of the observed
sender signal.

4. N and S: “North” and “South” part of the frame.
5. S1,… and A1,…: States and actions.
6. Circle: The circle token.

Attributes
1. delay (a): there is a delay of a milliseconds caused by
the action.
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Table A4.
Wiggle rotate: augmentation and analogical match sketch.

Lowest level

Representations of evidence e

Representations of core k

(1) timed sequence of circle locations

(1) object controlled with directional pad and
rotate object button augment with 2D space
⇝

augment with lines ⇝
(2) path
augment with location ⇝
(3) path to location
augment with symmetry ⇝
(4) path to location then symmetrical path
Match level

(5)

augment with counting ⇝

path to location and number

⇔

Relations
1. is-on(a,b): location a is on the board b.
2. north-of (a,b): location a is spatially north of location b.
3. shorter(a,b): time a is shorter than time b.
4. exists(a,b): object a exists in state b.
5. is-at (a,b): the object that exists in this state a is at
location b on the board.
6. transition-by-action (a,b,c): action b transitions state a into state c.
In Figure A4 we can see that the communicator’s behavior is
represented with two board locations(3,2)and(3,3) that
lie on a board. These locations are both communicative and
there is a line between them. This line has an orientation and
is directed. Its starting point is (3,3) and the orientation
is represented by the fact that it aligns with a north–south
frame of reference, directed north.
Augmenting the evidence representation: In this section we
show how a process of deep analogical inference can create
a representation that can lead to a candidate hypothesis. We
illustrate how this process works for the perceptual representation of the communicator’s signal. The same process can
build a novel representation of the core.
The perceptual representation of the signal e that forms
the target of the example augmentation only includes the
communicator’s movement over the board (using simple
spatial and temporal relations). This representation is based
on a discretized concept of time, i.e., there is a sequence
of states and actions. In each state there exists a circle at a
location on the board. Between these states there is a certain time-delay: if there is a delay of 0.5 seconds between S1

  augment with lines ⇝
(2) controller for moving object in 2D space and
rotate object button
augment with lines ⇝
(3) controller for moving object along path and
rotate object button
augment with counting
(4) controller for moving object along path and a
button to rotate object a number of times

and S2, then the world is in state S1 for 0.5 seconds and then
transitions to state S2. Additionally, there is a representation
of the board and of a frame of reference. For readability we
limit the representation to the parts involved in the analogy.
Figure A5 again shows the evidence representation in black.
It also shows (in different colors) each individual augmentation that is needed to generate the structure that will be part
of the candidate hypothesis.
Each augmentation is performed by ﬁrst matching
to a representation of knowledge k ∈ K and then projecting the biggest possible structure over from that
knowledge representation k, increasing the richness of the
signal representation e. Figure A6 contains all the basic
knowledge representations used in the deep analogical
inference with the following sequence of augmentations:
(1) Communicative pause, (2) Communicative, (3) Lines, (4)
Align line, (5) Location, (6) Starting point, (7) Direct line,
and (8) Orient. The basic knowledge representations do not
contain any knowledge speciﬁcally about the TCG. They do
make use of several new objects and relations. We list these
below and afterwards give an intuitive interpretation of the
knowledge representations.
Objects
1. Communicative: represents an abstract conceptualization of communicative aspects of the behavior (e.g., this
can represent segmentation information).
Relations
1 is-comm(a,b): concept a is communicative.
2 Line (a,b): there exists a line between location a and b.
Note that this relation is not ordered, i.e., line (a,b) ≡
line(b,a).
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direction-of
has-direction
axis-of
orientation

location
start-point

line

is-comm

Communicative
is-at

is-on

A

exists

delay

S1

A1

is-at
exists

Circle

transition-by-action

line
is-on

Board
shorter

is-comm

aligns-with

S2

FoR

is-on

B

is-on

N

is-at

delay

exists

A2

S3

north-of

S

transition-by-action

Figure A5.
The final augmented representation of a wiggle. Each color shows a different analogical augmentation.

3 start-point(a,b): location a is a starting point with
property b.
4 location(a,b): object a is a location with property b.
5 has-direction(a,b): line a is directed to part of the
frame b.
6 aligns-with (a,b): line a aligns with axis of the
frame b.
7 orientation (a,b,c): two locations a and c that are
connected by line b have an orientation.
8 axis-of (a,b): axis b of the frame applies to orientation a.
9 direction-of (a,b): orientation a is directed to part
of the frame b.

6 Starting point: “If two locations on a line are communicative and one of them communicates the location, then
that location is the start point of the movement along
that line.”
7 Direct line: “If a line with a start point aligns with a line
in a different frame of reference, then that line has a direction towards the second location of that other frame of
reference.”
8 Orient: “If a line has a particular direction, then it can be
thought of as having an orientation. Here, orientation is a
direction along a particular axis with respect to a different
frame of reference.”

Intuitive interpretations
1 Communicative pause: “If a state/action takes more time
compared to the state/action that comes after it, this state/
action is communicative.”
2 Communicative: “If a state/action is communicative, then
the location the object is in at that state is communicative.”
3 Lines: “If an object is ﬁrst in location 1 and then in location 2,
then one can think of a line being between those locations.”
4 Align line: “If there are two lines between two pairs of
locations that have a similar relationship (e.g., north-of)
then these two lines align.”
5 Location: “If an object exists in a communicative location
and stays there longer than in its next location, then that
location is hypothesized to be the location.”

To start deep analogical inference we ﬁrst augment the
evidence representation (black representation in Figure
A5) with Communicative pause. This involves, ﬁrst, ﬁnding an analogical match between Communicative pause
and the perceptual representation, and then projecting
over the biggest possible structure. In this case, the relation is-comm and object Communicative are projected
over. The other knowledge representations keep augmenting the representation in a similar fashion, enriching the
representation of the communicator’s signal. Eventually,
the sequence of augmentations leads to the representation
that was used previously in this section to generate a candidate hypothesis about the meaning of the communicator’s signal.
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Figure A6.
The knowledge representations that are used for augmenting the wiggle representation.

Candidate hypothesis for “wiggle apex.” A candidate
hypothesis is based on an analogical match between an augmented representation of evidence and an augmented representation of a core. Next we introduce the representation
of the core which represents the concept of a triangle that
points (see black representation in Figure A7). It is presupposed that this representation is the result of deep analogical
inference and it includes new attributes:

Attributes
1. is-point (a): object a is a point.
2. is-apex (a): object a is an apex.
3. is-base (a): object a is a base.
The triangle representation consists of three points (P1 (the
apex), P2, and P3) and a base (Base). These objects are all
located on an object, i.e., the abstract triangle. There are
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direction-of
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orientation
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is-comm
line
is-on

line

line

is-on

is-on

A
N

is-on
Object

is-apex
is-point

is-point

P1
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(a) A representation of a candidate hypothesis (meaning) including the projection and variable instantiations.

P1
Axis

N

P2

S

P3

Base
(3,3)
triangle at location (3,3)
aligning to N-S axis and
pointing north
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(b) Components and concepts.

Figure A7.
Candidate hypothesis. Parts annotated in red are structures that have been projected or variable-instantiated. They
represent the location of the triangle (3,3) and its orientation (“pointing north”).
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three lines, the sides of the triangle, and an additional line
from the base to the apex representing the axis of symmetry. The base and the apex are communicative, because additional information about these triangle properties is what
gives the triangle its location (conceptualized as location of
the base), orientation, and direction (conceptualized as an
alignment of the axis of symmetry with an axis of the frame
of reference).
The evidence and core representations presented here
analogically match. This match corresponds to the cognizer
understanding that the behavior and candidate meaning are
analogous. This, however, is not enough to explain how the
signal is hypothesized to have a speciﬁc meaning, i.e., we know
that the “the repetitive movement along an axis is analogous
to the pointing of the apex” but we do not know the speciﬁc
location and orientation of the triangle. To hypothesize these
speciﬁcs we need to project relational structures onto and
instantiate variables in the core representation from the representation of the signal, based on the analogical match.
In our example we only show one possible projection and
variable instantiation, i.e., the red structures in Figure A7a.
We project the spatial relation between the base and apex
from the base representation of sender behavior to the target

representation of triangle. In addition, we instantiate variables: A→N, B→S, and Base→(3,3). These inferences make
the candidate meaning more speciﬁc, because they contain
information that the triangle apex should be north of the
base and that the axis should align to the north–south axis of
the frame of reference.
The candidate hypothesis we illustrated in this section is
only possible by virtue of a process of deep analogical inference and the knowledge used. Given different representations,
analogical abduction proper would generate completely different candidate hypotheses. This illustrates how analogical
abduction proper can in principle generate sets of candidate
hypotheses. As argued in the main text, this process is isotropic, open-ended, novel, grounded, sensible, and psychologically realistic.

NOTES
1

Rotation is immediate (not animated), therefore a circle does
not appear to rotate and rectangles appear to be in the same
orientation after two rotations. Correctness of orientation is
evaluated relative to the appearance of the orientation, not
the number of times the player has rotated.
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